Editor’s Note: In 2015, Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work sparked wide-ranging debate within left-wing intellectual circles in Europe and North America. The book proposed automation, reduced working hours, and universal basic income as pathways for breaking out of the neoliberal framework and reopening the horizon of the future.
A decade on, artificial intelligence has advanced rapidly, global political and economic orders remain in flux, and the relationships between labour, technology, and the state have grown ever more complex. The publication of the Chinese-language edition now brings the book into a political and social context markedly different from that of its original emergence.
On this occasion, we invited one of the book’s authors, Alex Williams, for an interview to reflect on the book’s place within Western intellectual debates and to consider what new questions, controversies, and possibilities might arise as the ideas of post-work and postcapitalism enter the Chinese-speaking world.
Since Inventing the Future was published, technological and socioeconomic conditions have shifted dramatically—from the consolidation of platform capitalism and rapid advances in AI to major changes in the global political landscape. How do you assess these developments today? Do you think they have brought us any closer to the possibility of postcapitalism and a “world without work,” or have they instead pushed that horizon further away?
The transformations in global politics, technology, and society seem to reframe the argument of the book in two ways. On the one hand, they serve to confirm some of its core theses: that technology must be attended to as a key logic of power, that artificial intelligence was going to become a world changing technology, and that the tensions within global neoliberalism were never going to be sustainable in the long-term. On the other hand, these developments have not been accompanied by an obvious shift towards either a successful leftist politics (certainly not in America, China, or Europe).
Yet the core idea of the book was not that technological development alone would usher in an age of less work, instead it sets out that technological change must be accompanied by the development of political forces that can guide that technology in ways that force the future we want to come to pass. The structural shifts we have seen have in no way invalidated the thesis of the book, in many ways they simply reassert its necessity.
At a time when pandemics, war, and economic instability seem to have become permanent features of everyday life, does the idea of a post‑work society still function as a politically mobilising imaginary? Looking back, are there elements of your critique of work—or the alternatives proposed in the book—that you would now want to revise, refine, or expand?
Very clearly, the analysis the book presents is incomplete. In choosing to focus on one particular political imaginary, the post-work future, it necessarily ignores many other significant problems and opportunities in the contemporary world.
One of these is the environmental crisis, which was considered at the time of writing but excised, largely for reasons of space. I also think that there should have been significantly more emphasis on the problem of capital itself, and the need to directly confront it.
One of the most striking parts of the book is your analysis of the Mont Pèlerin Society, particularly its commitment to a long‑term project of hegemonic formation through expertise, institutions, and public discourse. In today’s media environment—marked by declining trust in legacy media, algorithmic attention economies, and the dominance of outrage and rage‑bait—do you still see space for a similar long game for leftist ideas? If so, what might such a strategy look like today?
The only game is a long-term one, unfortunately, though one which is able to take up the opportunities offered by the contingent and the immediate. The notion that some ‘short cut’ exists to get to an advanced socialism is highly dubious. Take for example the global neo-fascist right. They were able to execute a flexible plan to overtake institutions, media, the online environment, and so on, through innovative means. They have proven to be massively successful, even if only at capturing states throughout the world in the years since 2016. One of their leading thinkers and strategists, Steve Bannon, explicitly takes a Gramscian view on the mechanics of power, that politics is downstream from culture. Hence the new right’s obsession with culture wars and issues that seem on their face to be ridiculous or silly. For me, this has demonstrated the continued necessity of a hegemonic framework for any leftist strategy.
What such a strategy would look like today in specifics is less certain. In many respects, a lot would depend on the specific context in which it is being developed, the national or regional conditions and constraints involved in the particular situation. But the conditions which have given rise to the collapse of neoliberalism have not changed or improved. In many senses, the global political situation is more perilous, and even less able to provide ordinary people with material abundance than ever. It is with a concrete analysis of the interests of the people, in particular of those interests that are denied under the present system, that any strategy must begin.
Much of Inventing the Future is shaped by European political experience. In many parts of Asia, however, long working hours, intense competition, and tightly constrained political conditions are the norm. Do these contexts pose distinct structural challenges for post‑capitalist or post‑work thinking? How might alternative futures need to be imagined differently in response to these conditions?
Every politics must always be refined in terms of the conditions that actually pertain in a given place and time. But in many ways, one could argue that the South East Asian political situation is significantly more ripe for a post-work politics than Europe or America. The rise of such social forms as the Chinese ‘lying flat’ and anti-work ideology demonstrate the organic nature of the reaction to such hyper-competitive and exploitative systems of labour. But these incipient notions require formation and political expression, strategy and ideology. Clearly such dynamics as expansionist AI technologies reducing employment opportunities, or environmental crises threatening the reduction in habitable space on the planet could lead to opportunities for a post-work socialist politics.
But such opportunities need strategic intentionality to turn them from freely circulating currents into a coherent political force. And in every case, much will also depend on the structural conditions of politics in a given nation. How could the ‘productivism’ of the Chinese state be converted towards a national anti-work politics? Would this even be possible within the structures of the Party form? It seems to my eyes as an outsider that at present this looks highly unlikely. Yet is this less likely than Deng’s dramatic reforms of the economy in the 1980s?
With the publication of a Chinese‑language edition of Inventing the Future, the book enters social and political contexts quite different from those in which it was originally written. How do you imagine it might be read in these settings? Are there particular debates, tensions, or new questions you would hope this encounter might open up?
This encounter between the book and the Chinese political situation is one which excites me. I would be hopeful that questions could run in both directions – both towards the European left and towards the Chinese one. Such questions become increasingly key as the hegemony of the United States on global economic and political affairs appears to slip more and more into difficulties itself. In some senses, the book’s critical half at this point is more of historical interest, in terms of the history of the western radical left in the 2010s. I think the prospective half will be of greater interest for readers in a Chinese context.
In particular, I think the most important question is of how to control technological development for the benefit of the people. This has a very different character within the setting of China, where the state has for some time now taken a much more ‘active’ role in guiding the development of technology than elsewhere in the world. This has included the kind of ‘disciplining’ of technology sector oligarchs that would be very welcome in the United States. The country has also spread its investment bets rather more broadly than the global North countries, looking not just to AI but also green energy technologies amongst others, and this will also inevitably create different pressures and incentives. Finally, there is the unique nature of the Chinese state, and its relationships to both capitalism and socialism. How does a post-work politics fare under these conditions, is it possible, and what new strategies and forms should it take?